Thursday, July 23, 2009

Questioning Chase and Simon’s (1973) “Perception in Chess”: The “Experience Recognition” Hypothesis

We have a new paper to come out, and here's the info. Please drop us a message should you be interested. It should come out soon in http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.07.008. But while it's scheduled, it isn't redirecting yet.


Questioning Chase and Simon’s (1973) “Perception in Chess”: The “Experience Recognition” Hypothesis

By Alexandre Linhares & Anna Elizabeth T.A. Freitas, to appear in New Ideas in Psychology.

Abstract. Pattern recognition lies at the heart of the cognitive science endeavor. In this paper, we provide some criticism of this notion, using studies of chess as an example. The game of chess is, as significant evidence shows, a game of abstractions: pressures; force; open files and ranks; time; tightness of defense; old strategies rapidly adapted to new situations. These ideas do not arise on current computational models, which apply brute force by rote-memorization. In this paper we assess the computational models of CHREST and CHUMP, and argue that chess chunks must contain semantic information. This argument leads to a new and contrasting claim, as we propose that key conclusions of Chase and Simon’s (1973) influential study stemmed from a non-sequitur. In the concluding section, we propose a shift in philosophy, from “pattern recognition” to a framework of “experience recognition”.

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